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1. Introduction
It’s sometimes said that (maximising act-) consequentialism is too 
demanding.1 Suppose Ann can donate her kidney to save Ben’s life. 
Consequentialism suggests that, so long as by donating Ann brings about the 
best consequence, she is required to do so. Surely, the sceptics say, morality 
can’t be that demanding.
Consequentialists have responded to this objection in various ways. On 
the one hand, they insist consequentialism doesn’t in fact demand that much. 
Some put forward less demanding versions of consequentialism, such as rule 
and satisficing consequentialism.2 Others make the case that pretty much doing 
what most people are doing will bring about the best consequence.3 On the other
hand, some consequentialists bite the bullet and accept that morality is indeed 
very demanding. Some bolster this response by emphasising the fact that the 
demandingness objection is poorly motivated (“why assume that morality isn’t 
demanding?”).4 Some point out that the demandingness objection is in tension 
with other positions held by non-consequentialists, and therefore non-
consequentialism is incoherent.5 Still, some attempt to explain away the force of 
1    Unless otherwise noted, I will use “consequentialism” to mean “maximising act-
consequentialism.”
2    Brandt (1959, 1967), Harsanyi (1977), Rawls (1955), and Slote & Pettit (1984).
3    Pettit (1997).
4    Singer (1972).
5    Kagan (1982).
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the demandingness objection with a general scepticism towards intuitions (i.e., 
they “psychologise” intuitions).6
In this paper, I focus on a third type of response, which holds that the 
demandingness objection is ill-conceived. In particular, I examine the argument 
put forward by David Sobel in “the Impotence of the Demandingness 
Objection.”7 In Section 2, I lay out Sobel’s argument and clarify its force. I then 
examine and reject a response to Sobel (Section 3), before defending a different 
response (Section 4 & 5).
I will defend three claims: first, whether the demandingness objection is 
impotent depends on how “impotence” is interpreted; second, the 
demandingness objection should be understood as an objection that derives its 
force from a plausible intuition, and so construed, the objection is forceful (I 
will say more about forcefulness and impotence in Section 2); third, we can 
justify the intuition, on which the demandingness objection rests, by 
conceptualising moral demands as motivational difficulty.
2. What is impotent about the demandingness objection?
The demandingness objection to consequentialism can be understood as 
follows.
PREMISE 1. Any plausible moral theory cannot be too 
demanding. If a moral theory is too demanding, that give us a 
reason to reject it.
PREMISE 2. Consequentialism is too demanding.
CONCLUSION. We have a reason to reject consequentialism.8
To make the case for PREMISE 2, one might posit
6    Singer (2007).
7    Sobel (2007).
8    There can be different versions of this objection, depending on how we understand its
force. In the extreme, one could argue the fact that a theory is too demanding is a decisive
reason against the theory. I adopt a more neutral formulation here.
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PREMISE (a). A moral theory is too demanding if it requires Ann 
to sacrifice her kidney to save Ben’s life.
PREMISE (b). Consequentialism requires Ann to sacrifice her 
kidney to save Ben’s life.
Therefore, consequentialism is too demanding.
Sobel’s argument that the demandingness objection is impotent focuses 
on PREMISE (a). He notes that in this case, Ben has more to lose than Ann: if a 
moral theory doesn’t require Ann to sacrifice her kidney, it would permit Ben to 
die. If we focus on the costs to each individual alone, we would have to 
conclude that a moral theory that doesn’t require Ann to sacrifice her kidney 
would be even more demanding for Ben. This is because the cost to Ben (i.e., 
life) is higher than that to Ann (i.e., a kidney). Plausibly, it would be 
unacceptable if a moral theory is “too demanding” whether or not it requires 
Ann to sacrifice her kidney. Thus it's also true that if the cost to Ben is higher 
than that to Ann, PREMISE (a) must be rejected. A moral theory might not be 
too demanding even if it requires Ann to sacrifice her kidney after all.
Sobel suggests that to reject this result those who make the 
demandingness objection need the following distinction:
DISTINCTION. In assessing how demanding a moral theory is, 
what it requires of a helper counts more than what it permits the 
aided to bear.
In other words, we need to draw a distinction between the costs that a moral 
theory requires us to take on (“required costs”) and those that a moral theory 
permits to befall us (“costs permitted”). We must hold that the cost to Ann 
counts more than the cost to Ben because the former is required by morality 
while the latter is merely permitted.
According to Sobel, the problem is that
The moral significance of the distinction between costs a moral 
theory requires and costs it permits must already be in place 
before the Objection gets a grip. But this is for the decisive break 
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with Consequentialism to have already happened before we feel 
the pull of the Objection9.
The conclusion is not merely that the Objection has as an upshot 
that costs required by a moral theory are more demanding than 
costs permitted […]. Arguably any argument against 
Consequentialism would need to have such an upshot. Rather, the 
thought here is that the Objection needs to presuppose the moral 
significance of such distinctions as a premise in reaching the 
conclusion that Consequentialism is problematically demanding. 
The Objection does not help justify such a premise. This is why 
we should reject Consequentialism independently of the Objection
or not at all.10
Put it differently: to reach PREMISE (a), we need to presuppose 
DISTINCTION, but once we presuppose DISTINCTION, we already 
presuppose that consequentialism is false. Therefore, the demandingness 
objection, for which PREMISE (a) is needed, is “impotent”, because we should 
reject consequentialism independently of it or not at all.
Now, we can classify any objection to a theory into two categories. For 
one, there are internal objections – these are objections that do not rely on 
further claims rejected by the theory they critique. Here is an example: it’s 
argued that there are cases – the so-called “no-difference cases” – where 
individual acts, despite being intuitively impermissible, do not seem to make a 
difference to the overall consequence; consequentialism, therefore, might 
struggle to account for these cases.11 Notice that this objection is made within a 
consequentialist framework, as it shares the consequentialist assumption that 
what matters for the permissibility of an act is only its consequences. The 
objection here is that, even with this assumption, consequentialism has difficulty
making sense of certain intuitively impermissible acts.
9    Sobel (2007), p. 3
10    Sobel (2007), p 3-4.
11    See, for example, Sinnott-Armstrong (2005), Kagan (2011), Nefsky (2011).
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There are also external objections, of which the demandingness objection
is one, that do rely on claims that are not shared by the theory they critique. 
Sobel’s argument, then, is that all external objections are impotent. It helps to 
illustrate this point with a different external objection. Some people object to 
consequentialism with this well-known case, Footbridge: a runaway trolley is 
about to kill five people, and you can save these five by pushing an innocent 
person from the footbridge, causing his death.12 Non-consequentialists argue:
PREMISE (a)*. Any plausible moral theory cannot imply that it is
permissible for you to push the person in Footbridge. If a moral 
theory does imply this, that gives us a reason to reject the theory.
PREMISE (b)*. Consequentialism implies that it is permissible for
you to push the person in Footbridge.
CONCLUSION. We have a reason to reject consequentialism.
Let us call this the “permissiveness objection” to consequentialism. Now, we 
could make a similar charge of “impotence” by pointing out that PREMISE (a)* 
relies on
DISTINCTION*. To determine whether an individual is permitted 
to  to bring about some good at a certain cost, it matters how the 
good is brought about (either in terms of the causal relations 
between the good and the cost, or whether the agent intends the 
cost as a means to the good).13
The reason is that non-consequentialists need to distinguish Footbridge from a 
different case, Side Track. In this case, a runaway trolley is about to kill five 
people, and you can save these five by redirecting the trolley to a different track, 
killing another innocent person. Non-consequentialists would hold that any 
plausible moral theory must imply that it is permissible for you to redirect the 
12    Thomson (1985).
13    How to justify DISTINCTION* is a major area of dispute among non-
consequentialists. For two prominent opposing views, see Kamm (2008, chapter 5) and 
Tadros (2011, chapter 6&7). 
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trolley in Side Track. As such, DISTINCTION is needed to preserve PREMISE 
(a)*
PREMISE (a)* requires non-consequentialists to embrace 
DISTINCTION*. One might then argue the permissiveness objection is also 
impotent: in order for the permissiveness objection to get a grip, we must 
presuppose DISTINCTION*; but this is for the decisive break with 
Consequentialism to have already happened before we feel the pull of the 
permissiveness objection; as such, we should reject consequentialism 
independently of the permissiveness objection or not at all.
So, if Sobel is right that the demandingness objection – which is often 
used to motivate agent-centred options – is impotent, we should also conclude 
that the permissiveness objection, often used to motivate agent-centred 
constraints, is also impotent. Perhaps, consequentialists should rejoice at this 
implication; perhaps, we should all be consequentialists after all.
Now, we should ask what exactly is meant when we say external 
objections are impotent. Sobel seems to have in mind the the view that
If a theory T has an implication I, the objection O that I is counter-
intuitive is impotent just in case O relies on a further claim C 
which is incompatible with T. 
For instance, given that consequentialism (T) implies that Ann is required to 
sacrifice her kidney (I), the demandingness objection (O) is impotent because it 
relies on DISTINCTION* which consequentialists reject. The demandingness 
objection and the permissiveness objection are impotent because on their own 
they have no force against T though they follow from DISTINCTION and 
DISTINCTION* which, if true, would have force against T; we can put this 
point more precisely: 
INDEPENDENCE: To say that an objection O to a theory T is 
impotent is to say that we could reject T on the basis of claim C 
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(if true) without relying on O though O derives from C. 
Now, I think Sobel could be right that if we interpret the charge of “impotence” 
as INDEPENDENCE, all external objections are impotent. But that is hardly a 
surprising result! By definition, external objections rely on a further claim that, 
if justified, is itself sufficient to amount a challenge to the theory.
We should not confuse the charge of “impotence” with lack of force 
construed as:
FORCEFULNESS: To say an objection O to a theory T is forceful 
is to say that O gives (considerable or sufficient) reason to reject 
T.
External objections, such as the demandingness objection and the 
permissiveness objection, can have force. These objections derive their force, I 
maintain, from plausible intuitions. The force of the demandingness objection is 
the thought that, intuitively, it would be too demanding and therefore 
unacceptable if Ann is required to sacrifice her kidney. Similarly, the force of the
permissiveness objection is the thought that, intuitively, it would be 
unacceptable if you are permitted to push the person in Footbridge. Note that 
this doesn’t mean these intuitions do not require further justifications. Non-
consequentialists only need to maintain that their intuitive force is independent 
of the force of their justification and that we have some reason to reject 
consequentialism on this basis even before we offer a justification for the 
intuition. These intuitions have some force prior to justification.14
The crucial point here is that I think Sobel misrepresents the role 
intuition can play in the demandingness objection. Sobel thinks intuition carries 
14    Nor need they claim the intuitions are self-justified. Tedesco ascribes this view to  
non-consequentialists and then proceeds to try to refute it (Tedesco (2011)). I don’t think 
non-consequentialists need to rest their case on intuitions being self-justified (which is 
implausible). They only need to maintain that the intuitive force is independent of the 
force of its justification, and we have some reason to reject consequentialism on this basis
even before we offer a justification for the intuition.
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no weight and it provides no reason to reject a theory, as all the weight is carried
by the idea the agent's costs have precedence over the patient's. Against this I 
want to contend powerful intuitions like these carry much weight, they give us 
reasons to reject, or suspect, consequentialism for instance, even before we have
a rationale. In other words, the force of the demandingness objection is derived 
from the plausibility of our intuitions.
We can grasp this point from a different angle. Sometimes, after we have 
defended a claim C which, if true, is sufficient for rejecting a theory T, we go on 
to argue that a further claim C+ follows from C, and C+ is itself intuitively 
plausible. The reason we do this, I propose, is that we would have more reason 
to reject T with C and C+ than with C alone. This is because with C alone, the 
reason we have for rejecting T depends solely the plausibility of our defence for 
C, while with C and C+ we have an additional reason, reason derived from the 
intuitive plausibility of C+, for rejecting T. So even if we already have a defence
D for the distinction between required costs and costs permitted, it still matters 
that it's intuitively implausible that Ann is required to donate her kidney. With 
this intuitive claim, the reason for rejecting consequentialism now depends on 
both the plausibility of D and the plausibility of the intuition.15
Here is the upshot: Sobel is right that in order for PREMISE (a) to be 
true, DISTINCTION must be true, but that does not mean that intuition, on its 
15   It might be said that my argument would justify arbitrary intuitions. If someone has 
the intuition that interracial marriage is impermissible, presumably we would not want to 
say that intuition gives them a reason to object to interracial marriage. Now I am happy to
grant that having this intuition gives the person some reason to object to interracial 
marriage if that intuition meets certain other conditions (for example, if you are a 
coherentist, that intuition must cohere with other things that the person believes). Very 
often I suspect that people who hold morally objectionable intuitions cannot meet these 
conditions. Even if some morally objectionable intuitions survive this filtering process, if 
there are other, stronger reasons to reject these intuitions – as there presumably would be 
in cases like interracial marriage – then these intuitions should be abandoned. For a 
similar point on how we approach morally objectionable intuitions, see Kagan (2016), p. 
8. I thank the editor of this journal for the objection.           
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own, is otiose. The demandingness objection and the permissiveness objection 
give us some independent reasons to reject consequentialism – even though we 
could as well reject consequentialism on the basis of DISTINCTION and 
DISTINCTION* (if they are justified). The demandingness objection is forceful.
3. Moral demands as costs
I’ve argued that regardless of whether the demandingness objection is 
impotent, it is forceful. Still, we would want a justification for the intuition that 
the objection rests on – namely, we would want to justify the distinction between
required costs and costs permitted. In this section, I look at Fiona Woollard’s 
proposed justification and explain why it is inadequate.
Woollard’s claim is that only required costs count as moral demands, and 
as such, only required costs are relevant to the demandingness objection.16 Her 
reasoning is as follows. First, she posits that a moral theory is too demanding 
just in case, for the most part, we cannot expect a reasonable agent conform to 
the theory.17 By a “reasonable agent”, Woollard has in mind someone who “[lies]
somewhere between saints and sinners”, “[is] not totally self-absorbed”, and 
“[has] a reasonable concern to act morally.”18 If, in the majority of cases, even a 
reasonable agent cannot be expected to conform to a moral theory, the theory is 
too demanding.
Woollard then notes that, compared to the costs permitted, required costs 
16    So, in this sense, Woollard is arguing for a stronger claim than DISTINCTION. 
DISTINCTION says that, compared to what a moral theory permits to happen, what the 
theory requires counts more towards its moral demands on an agent. Namely, required 
costs count more towards moral demands than costs permitted. Woollard, by contrast, 
holds that costs permitted do not count as moral demands at all. (Because costs permitted 
do not count at all, it is of course true that required costs count more.) 
17    Woollard (2016): 96-97. Woollard’s account follows the tradition of many others in a
link between “moral demands” and “what a reasonable agent would do.” See Herman 
(1993), Hill (2002), Miller (2004), Noggle (2009), Stohr (2011), and Schmidt (2017).
18    Woollard (2016), p. 96.
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are distinctive because they are costs that “[the agent] has the opportunity to 
avoid, but only by failing to conform to the relevant moral demand.”19 As such, 
only required costs give rise to a choice between “accepting the cost and failing 
to conform to the moral demand.”20 In other words, only when an agent faces 
required costs does she have to decide whether to conform to a moral theory.
That means whether a moral theory is too demanding hangs on whether 
we can expect a reasonable agent to conform to the theory, and whether we can 
expect a reasonable agent to conform to the theory hangs on required costs. 
Therefore, only required costs count as moral demands, and only required costs 
are relevant to the demandingness objection.
As I see it, the problem of Woollard’s analysis is this: she assumes 
without argument that whether a moral theory is too demanding hangs on 
whether we can expect a reasonable agent to conform to the theory. She says,
An underlying concern of the demandingness objection is the 
worry that some theories or principles ask so much of the agent 
that it is not reasonable to expect an agent to choose to conform to
the moral principle. Behind this lies the thought that morality 
should be such that it is generally reasonable to expect an agent to
choose to conform to it.21
One might ask: why should the demandingness objection be concerned 
with whether it is reasonable to expect someone to choose to conform to a moral
theory? More specifically, one might instead posit that the demandingness 
objection should be concerned with whether it is reasonable to expect someone 
to accept a moral theory when the theory permits some costs to befall her. In 
other words, it is true that if the demandingness objection is concerned with 
whether it is reasonable to expect someone to choose to conform to a moral 
19    Woollard (2016), p. 94.
20    Ibid.
21    Ibid.
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theory, only the required costs count as moral demands. But we need a 
justification for the antecedent – we want to know why the demandingness 
objection should be understood in this way. This is because, if the 
demandingness objection is instead concerned with whether it is reasonable to 
expect someone to accept a moral theory when the theory permits some costs to 
befall her, we would get the result that only costs permitted count as moral 
demands.
The upshot is this: Woollard correctly identifies what is distinctive about 
required costs – that they are concerned with whether it is reasonable to expect 
someone to choose to conform to a moral theory; what she fails to do is to 
justify why we should focus on what is distinctive about required costs instead 
of, say, what is distinctive about costs permitted. Woollard’s analysis relies on 
privileging the perspective of the moral agents at the expense of moral patients, 
in that we must treat only what’s distinctive about the moral agents as relevant to
moral demands, as opposed to what’s distinctive about the moral patients (faced 
with a choice regarding whether to accept the moral theory). As such, Woollard’s
justification for DISTINCTION is inadequate.
4. Moral demands as difficulty
In Section 3, I identified the problem with Woollard’s justification for 
DISTINCTION.22 In this section, I make the case that we can justify 
DISTINCTION by conceptualising moral demands as motivational difficulty.
Here is the central claim: a moral theory is too demanding just in case it 
requires the agent to do things (or to refrain from doing things) that are 
unreasonably difficult to do (to refrain from doing).23 The difficulty I have in 
22    In fact, I suspect that so long as we conceptualise moral demands as costs, we will 
struggle justify DISTINCTION without begging the question (though I do not have an 
argument for this stronger claim).
23    McElwee (2015, 2016), Chappell (2019), Lippert-Rasmussen (2019).
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mind here is motivational difficulty, which in turn can be analysed as the 
likelihood of success conditional on trying. Roughly, the difficulty of -ing is 
measured by how likely it is that an agent succeeds in -ing if she tries (and 
does not give up trying) to .24 i-ing is more motivationally difficult than j-ing
just in case, if the agent tries (and does not give up trying) to i and to j , she is 
more likely to succeed in i -ing.
Conceptualising moral demands as motivational difficulty helps justify 
the distinction between required costs and costs permitted. The question of 
motivational difficulty only arises when a moral theory requires an agent to do 
something at a certain cost. In other words, required costs are related to 
motivational difficulty in a way that costs permitted are not: the higher the 
required costs of -ing, the more motivational difficulty it is to . For this 
reason, only required costs are relevant to moral demands.25
Now, one might raise an objection, similar to the one I raised against 
Woollard’s analysis: why should we think that the demandingness objection is 
concerned with motivational difficulty? Am I not also assuming what needs to 
be argued for?
I think we can offer a rationale for why the demandingness objection 
should be concerned with motivational difficulty. Any plausible moral theory, it 
seems, must recognise the limitations on human motivational capacity. The 
underlying point is that morality is for beings like us – beings whose 
motivational capacity is limited. Just as it would be unreasonable to require 
someone to rescue a drowning child from a dangerous swimming pool if she 
cannot swim (“ought implies can”), it would be unreasonable to require 
24    This analysis of motivational difficulty is borrowed from Southwood (2016).
25    I say “only required costs are relevant to moral demands” instead of “only required 
costs count as moral demands” because, under my conception, it is motivational 
difficulty that counts as moral demands. 
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someone to donate her kidney if doing so is unreasonably difficult (“ought 
implies can will”).26
I concede that, to justify my claim that an agent is not required to  if -
ing is unreasonably difficult, a lot more needs to be said. I will restrict myself to 
making one further remark. I pointed out that Woollard’s analysis relies on 
assuming that the demandingness objection is concerned with whether it is 
reasonable to expect someone to choose to conform to a moral theory. This is 
problematic because one might similarly posit the demandingness objection as 
being concerned with whether it is reasonable to expect someone to accept a 
moral theory when the theory permits some costs to befall her. The latter 
construal would get us the result that only costs permitted count as moral 
demands.
Now, notice that a similar objection cannot be made against my 
argument. My claim is that the demandingness objection is concerned with 
whether doing something at a certain cost is unreasonably difficult, and I said 
that we should justify this with reference to the limitations on human 
motivational capacity. Here, an objector might posit instead that the 
demandingness objection should be concerned with whether it would be 
unreasonably difficult for someone to accept that morality permits a cost to 
befall her.
My response is two-fold. In one sense, there is no fact of the matter as to 
whether it would be unreasonably difficult for someone to accept that morality 
permits a cost to befall her – there is no question as to whether it would be 
unreasonably difficult for Ben to accept that morality permits Ann not to save 
him. This is because morality doesn’t ask Ben to do anything.
However, there is another sense in which the question of unreasonable 
26    Cf. Estlund (2011).
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difficulty does arise. Although morality doesn’t ask Ben to do anything, it does 
presumably ask Ben to refrain from taking Ann’s kidney. So, there is indeed a 
question as to whether, for Ben, refraining from taking Ann’s kidney is 
unreasonably difficult – if it is, then although Ann is not required to sacrifice her
kidney voluntarily, Ben is not required to refrain from taking it either and he is 
therefore permitted to impose the cost on Ann.
Now, I think this is a very interesting (if somewhat surprising) 
implication. I do not know if refraining from taking someone else’s kidney when
one is dying is indeed unreasonably difficult; I do not want to take a stand on 
this point. Nevertheless, there are more clear-cut cases. Suppose, as I think is 
plausible, that it would be unreasonably difficult for wealthy citizens in 
developed countries to donate a large portion of their income to charities, 
especially when very few others are doing the same.27 My account then suggests 
that these wealthy citizens are not required to donate a large sum of their money 
voluntarily. But, as is also plausible, if it would be unreasonably difficult for 
those in dire need to refrain from taking the resources from these wealthy 
citizens, refraining from taking the resources from these wealthy individuals is 
also not required. Therefore, although wealthy citizens in developed countries 
might not be required to donate, it would be permissible for those in dire needs 
to forcibly take their money away.28
In sum, unlike Woollard’s argument, the account that I develop here does 
27    Cf. MacAskill, Mogensen, and Ord (2018).
28    Of course, it’s not the case it would be unreasonably difficult for wealthy citizens in 
developed countries to donate any amount of money, and as such, donating a certain 
amount voluntarily is still required. In addition, it is not always permissible for those in 
dire needs to forcibly take money from the wealthy, even when refraining from doing so 
is unreasonably difficult. Plausibly, the means employed must be proportional, and if 
forcibly taking resources from the wealthy infringes on other rights of theirs (such as the 
right to physical safety), that is something which counts against doing it. For further 
discussion see Nagel (1975) p. 145.
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not problematically beg the question. For one, we can justify why the 
demandingness objection should be concerned with motivational difficulty. I 
pointed out that, plausibly, morality should recognise the limitations on human 
motivational capacity. For another, my analysis does not privilege the 
perspective of the moral agents over that of the moral patients. In one sense, a 
moral theory doesn’t ask the moral patients to do anything, so there is no 
question as to whether accepting the theory is unreasonably difficult. In another 
sense, a moral theory does ask the moral patients to refrain from doing 
something, which might as well be unreasonably difficult.29 My account allows 
us to accommodate this: if refraining from doing something is unreasonably 
difficult, an individual is not required to do so.
5. Clarifications
I’ve argued that conceptualising moral demands as motivational 
difficulty helps justify the demandingness objection. In this section, I make two 
further clarifications.
Sobel briefly discusses and dismisses the idea that we should 
conceptualise moral demands as motivational difficulty. He says,
[A] significant reason it is difficult to comply with a morality that 
requires large costs of us as agents is that we assume such a moral
theory will result in a situation that is much worse for us, our 
loved ones, or our projects. But this needs not be so. For we might
be asked to bear large costs as agents yet receive large benefits as 
patients. Depending on the size and kind of benefits, it would be 
29    Here though, it might be said that “moral patients” in one context are just as “moral 
agents” in another context. So, regarding whether it would be unreasonably difficult for 
Ben to accept that morality permits Ann not to sacrifice her kidney, Ben is a moral 
patient; regarding whether it would be unreasonably difficult for Ben to refrain from 
taking Ann’s kidney, Ben is a moral agent. That’s why there is no conflict between saying
that in one sense, the question of motivational difficulty doesn’t arise for Ben, while in 
another sense, the question does arise.
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odd to call such a moral theory excessively demanding.30
The thought is that, plausibly, we would all fare better under consequentialism – 
although we would be asked to make (significant) sacrifices more often, we 
would also be recipients of (significant) benefits more often. If we all fare better 
under consequentialism, it then seems odd to object to consequentialism as 
being too demanding.31 The underlying point is this: we often find doing certain 
things difficult because we are mistaken about how we will be impacted; if only 
we could remember consequentialism will make us all better off, we would not 
find making large sacrifices difficult.
This objection, however, neglects the fact that motivating ourselves to do
certain things can be difficult, even when we know that these things are 
beneficial to us.32 I might know that eating healthy is beneficial, but that hardly 
means sticking to a healthy diet cannot be motivationally difficult. It’s true that 
reminding ourselves of the benefits we will receive often makes is easier to do 
certain things, but we should not overstate this point. It is plausible that donating
one’s kidney to save a stranger is very difficult – perhaps unreasonably so – no 
matter how many times we are gently reminded we will all be better off in the 
long term.
Unlike Sobel, Marcel van Ackeren recognises that doing beneficial things
can be difficult, and yet, he maintains that we should not conceptualise moral 
demands as motivational difficulty. He writes,
Suppose that Josh is morally required to help Jim move to another
town – let us say because Jim has already helped Josh move and 
also because they are good friends. Suppose Josh likes to do 
30    Sobel (2007), p. 10.
31    The argument that most people will fare better is often used as an argument for 
accepting consequentialism. See Harsanyi (1955, 1977). See also, Hare (2013, 2016).
32    Van Ackeren (2018): 319-20.
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weight training but, due to the commitment of helping, it seems 
that he will miss one training session in the gym. But Jim has 
many boxes filled with books so that Josh will be able to have a 
proper training session and profit from the consequences of 
exercising while helping his friend. The action will have extra 
non-moral value.
Now, what if Josh all of a sudden finds it difficult to motivate 
himself to do the extra training in the form of lifting Jim’s boxes 
although he will enjoy this exercise, and he also realizes the good 
long-term consequences. But does it make sense to say that this 
difficulty increases the demandingness of the moral obligation to 
help his friend?33
The last rhetorical question is meant to illustrate that only costs, and not 
difficulty, count as moral demands – even if Josh “all of a sudden finds it 
difficult to motivate himself”, this doesn’t seem to make what morality asks him
to do more demanding.
Now, notice my claim that one is not required to  if -ing is 
unreasonably difficult – what matters is not just how difficult one in fact finds -
ing to be; there is also a reasonableness constraint. That is to say, Josh might in 
fact all of a sudden find helping his friend difficult, but plausibly that would not 
be reasonable. More generally, I think van Ackeren’s analysis reveals a 
(common) misunderstanding of what it means to conceptualise moral demands 
as motivational difficulty. The suggestion I am making is not that we should 
understand the demandingness of -ing is in terms of, as a matter of fact, the 
motivational difficulty for a particular agent to . Instead, the claim is that the 
demandingness of -ing should be understood as how motivationally difficult -
ing would be for a reasonable agent – agent who shares a reasonable concern for
the well-being of others.34 That is to say, if even a reasonable agent would find 
-ing sufficiently difficult, -ing is not required. If, on the other hand, a 
33    Van Ackeren (2018): 325.
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particular agent in fact finds -ing sufficiently difficult due to some 
unreasonable idiosyncrasies, -ing is required all the same.
      To illustrate this point, imagine a variation of van Ackeren’s case. Suppose 
the reason Josh “all of a sudden finds it difficult to motivate himself” is that he 
discovered his grandmother just passed away. It then seems perfectly plausible 
that the moral demand on Josh has in fact increased, and this is despite the fact 
that the cost to him remains the same.35 Under my account, an explanation is 
readily available: unlike the original case, the increase in motivational difficulty 
is now reasonable – in that even a reasonable agent would find it more difficult 
to help others after the death of a loved one – and that’s why the moral demand 
on Josh has increased.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I’ve argued that the demandingness objection, understood 
as an intuitive objection, is forceful. I’ve also argued that we can justify the 
intuition on which the objection is based by conceptualising moral demands as 
motivational difficulty. Whether the objection is “impotent”, on the other hand, 
depends on how the charge of impotence is interpreted. At the very least, pace 
Sobel, the fact that consequentialism generates unreasonably difficult demands 
gives us a reason not to be consequentialists yet.
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